Talk:Lecture 9

Altin Dastmalchi, UCB So if i understood correctly from tonights lecture, the CW/RW threat is possible within our boarders. And the rate of clean up is relatively quick. But the question i wonder is why arent citizens and/or the Govt. doing more to ensure our safety if something was to break out. (ie raise awareness)... The second lecturer mentioned that water is a good method because it helps dilute it from your body. Now i want to know how many people in the US would know usefull information like that?

Synthetic Biology => Computer Viruses

Chris Fleizach - J. Keasling and others raised the obvious point that a synthetic biological agent is like a computer virus in a way (what isn't compared to computers these days?) In synthetic biology, the goal is to create small building blocks whose function is already known, put them together to achieve a more powerful, deterministic, interaction. Viruses (and all programs) also have small basic building blocks, instructions, that when you combine them together can form very powerful programs. This led me to think about how to protect against synthetic biological agents, which could also be analogous to anti-virus programs. It seems like you can create your own synthetic object that can pattern match a bad DNA sequence (anthrax, smallpox), then when the pattern matches, instruct it to destroy that object. Molecular computing is all about using DNA to match patterns, but mostly to solve computer problems. Surely, these methods can be applied to other fields.

Keasling then raised another point when he said it is possible to fool these DNA synthesis companies if you can re-order your sequences, which sounds a lot like a polymorphic virus in a way (it also sounds like DNA mutation, too). Virus scanners have, for the most part, succeeded in defeating polymorphic code through pattern analysis and other ideas. The advantage, I imagine, in biology, is that you can only change things around so much before they just don't do the same things anymore, perhaps invalidating the original, evil, goal. Whats the timeline on synthetic virus creator and a DNA virus scanner? Well the ebay prices were still too much for me.

Jameel Alsalam People do like making the comparison to computer viruses, huh? I think that there are perhaps some similarities, but also a host of differences that make the computer protection model not a very useful concept. It sounds like synthetic biology will make it possible to construct microbes with novel properties - both malignant and otherwise, but unlike the computer virus world, replication is a major cost. Suppose ten people are exposed to a synthetic virus by attackers, within some larger population (of say, 500,000 people in a city). Like in the case of the postal facility, really proper cleanup would require administering the antidote (if it could be developed quickly enough) to all 500,000 people (since you can probably not easily identify the 5 people who have actually been exposed). This same problem of not being able to identify just the real victims applies to computers, but in the computer world there is neglible cost to replicating the antidote - once it is developed 10 doses is the same as 500,000 (except maybe for the distribution).

Perhaps I am wrong, but another place where the analogy fatally breaks down is in the way a virus-scanning program can react to thousands of patterns. Since synthetic biology still relies on biological systems, the flexibility seems highly dependent upon the structure of the virus. It seems unlikely that you could create a single microbe that could combat thousands of virus definitions, stay dormant within the body watching for infection, etc. This would basically constitute redesigning the human immune system - maybe this is something that will happen eventually, but it seems much further out (politically, technologically, etc) than simply applying a strict engineering processs to the development of new vaccines, etc. --Jameel 11:10, 28 October 2005 (PDT)

--Chris DuPuis 11:59, 28 October 2005 (PDT) The similarity to a computer virus is that it's an attack that can be carried out entirely by a lone operator in his garage, rather than an international terrorist ring. The attacks are (or will become) trivial to implement, but the defenses are expensive, inconvenient (e.g. quarantine for humans, firewalls for computers), and far from perfect in the protection that they offer.

I don't see replication of the attack agent being a major cost, when that's what infectious diseases do.

Uranium for sale

Chris Fleizach - Christine L. Hartmann-Siantar, in her talk, brought up the story of a Turkish citizen, stopped at the Bulgarian border in 1999, with possession of a small vial of enriched uranium. It seemed she felt more secure because old-fashioned police work had managed to apprehend the criminal where newer detection devices would probably have failed. What I think is more frightening is that a nervous man was willing to offer a $10,000USD bribe in a vain attempt to get away. If bumbling, part-time smugglers are able to obtain enriched uranium, then certainly there are professionals who are into the game and moving much larger quantities of the materials. The fact that this man was stopped was due only to luck and his own incompetence. The number of other cases that have gone undetected must be larger by an order of several magnitudes. Which points to the ever greater need for automatic devices which can detect nuclear material. The past few lectures have all driven home the point that nuclear weapons, more so than radiological, biological and chemical, pose the greatest threat of all. Unfortunately, as it was also pointed out, it is quite difficult to build such a machine, which means the government needs to step in with a large infusion of cash. Has anyone mentioned the budget used for research into detection yet?

A nonproliferation treaty for synthetic biology?

Yi-Kai - As was pointed out last night, synthetic biology is a tool with great promise and great dangers. So I wonder if governments and corporations that want this tool would be willing to make a bargain: agree not to pursue harmful work (such as bioweapons), and in return, receive assistance in using synthetic biology for therapeutic purposes (such as pharmaceuticals). This is the same basic idea that underlies the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Furthermore, anyone who agrees to this deal would have to undergo intrusive inspections, done by an international agency similar to the IAEA.

There are some problems with this approach. First, it's not clear that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty really works that well. Nations that want nukes simply don't sign the treaty. Second, for synthetic biology, it's harder to verify compliance with a treaty. Unlike nuclear energy, synthetic biology doesn't require a large industrial base, and it's harder to distinguish between "good" and "bad" uses. So an international monitoring agency may not be enough; we may need to rely on governments to keep watch of what goes on inside their borders. We may end up cooperating with other countries to help them comply with the treaty.

Keunwoo Lee 14:07, 28 October 2005 (PDT): From this lecture, I concluded that it is inevitable that the tools of biological research (including weapons research) will, in the near future, be roughly as cheap and as widely-available as personal computers are today. It seems to me that treaties like the NPT are irrelevant when it comes to activities for which the prerequisites are that cheap and widely available. States and corporations may cooperate, but that doesn't do anything about the gang of biohackers in a garage. And, as an earlier lecture pointed out, the least deterrable actors are the most dangerous when it comes to the use of mass-casualty weapons.

Yi-Kai - I don't think it's inevitable that tools for biological research will be as widely available as personal computers. For instance, many countries do not allow their citizens to have guns, and they place restrictions on drugs and alcohol. These laws aren't 100% effective, but that doesn't mean they are worthless.

Maybe the goal of a nonproliferation treaty should be to create incentives for governments to regulate the use of synthetic biology. Even if we cannot prevent terrorists from acquiring these tools, we can increase our chances of detecting them.

Lecture 9: Thoughts & Questions

Ms. Siantar, does the Materials Protection Control & Acct. regime that is in place in the former USSR also cover chemical and biological weapons or does it strictly cover materials concerning nuclear devices?

Ms. Siantar, with respect to RDDs, you mentioned that the US focuses on prevention while Canada focuses on response, do you favor one of those focuses over another, if so, why? Also, is there much interaction between the US and Canada, are they working together on the same issue but each covering a different aspect in a coordinated fashion?

Dr. Raber, do we know how the anthrax escaped from Sverdlovsk?

Why wasn't Aum Shin. shut down after its attempt to release anthrax? Was round up of the organization carried out? Did the Jap. authorities focus intelligence operations against the organization after the attempt or not? If not, were there certain laws and policies that Aum Shin. sought refuge behind?

What type of chem agent was used in the Chechen theater situation by the Russian authorities?

How much of a concern are people fleeing the scene for authorities after a chem or bio attack? For instance, after the Tokyo subway attack did the authorities fear that those leaving might infect or subject others to danger and, if so, how did they deal with that? Is it likely that persons caught up in such attack would be quarantined for a period before being allowed to flee a scene?

I realize that the EPA was in charge of the clean up of the postal centers in NJ and DC but the $200 million figure seems absurd, especially when compared to the clean up experiences of ABC and NBC. Did the government have to deal with any special liability concerns -- ones that may have ended up adding to the cost and contributing to its elevation?

How much do liability concerns play into determining when a clearance phase is complete? Are persons making decisions pertaining to clearance worried about irrational public fears leading to lawsuits or not really?

Professor Keasling, I thought I over heard you discussing slides you had prepared but did not have the opportunity to submit in time for Wed's lecture, if that was the case, could you please make them available now?

Professor Keasling, I understand that Pres. Nixon's 1969 executive order ended chem and bio weapons research and maintenance in the US. Does synthetic bio allow the defense establishment away around that ban or not -- that is, can the DOD effectively engage in research re: synthetic bio and not violate the order?

A fellow classmate suggested that a nonproliferation treaty-type model might be employed to the synthetic bio situation. I would suggest a regime like that used for advanced missile technology -- the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It places limits on exporting tech know how and tech relating to advanced missile systems -- it seems to be more effective than the non-proliferation treaty -- thought it too has its problems.