User talk:Wjasonfisher

Professor Maurer, you discussed the tendency of terrorist organizations to splinter either when they encounter very strong opposition from the state or when they seek to enter into a ceasefire arrangement with the state. With respect to the IRA, could you comment on the Real IRA and its action at Omagh? I believe the Omagh bombing was the single deadliest action ever perpetrated by an Irish Nationalist paramilitary group. Was the Real IRA action likely a miscalculation by the group – i.e. did they mean to inflict that much carnage (it only seems that doing so would end their ability to exist as an “invisible man”)? Did the IRA or other of its offshoots and affiliated organizations subsequently seek to retaliate and/or police the Real IRA? Has the Real IRA been responsible for any terrorist actions since the Omagh bombing?

SMM: My sense is that they've all quieted down since 9/11 and the London train bombings. It is difficult to know for sure what went on in their heads ("miscalculation"). The fact that it stopped suggests that they either got a different result from the one they intended or else learned after the fact that this was a counter-productive strategy. I have tried to keep Ulster out of the discussion, it was more like a barely suppressed civil war than classical terrorism.

Professor Maurer, you mentioned the importance of funding with regard to perpetuating terrorist organizations and terrorism. Since 9/11, the US Treasury has really upped its willingness and capability to track and seize such funding. Do you have any knowledge of how this new focus has impacted the IRA’s (and Sinn Fein’s) funding? If the IRA’s levels of funding have decreased significantly, is it at all possible to determine how much has been the result of Treasury efforts and how much has been the product of an increased awareness amongst US citizens, following the experience of 9/11, of the terrible uses such funding can go to?

SMM: You hear both stories and both are presumably true. To what extent did the Treasury's campaign become more politically likely/possible because the political climate had shifted?

I believe that the IRA conducted some rather advanced and grand strikes such as the Brighton hotel bombing and the assassination of Lord Mountbatten. Is that correct? If so, do we have any indication on how those “grand” attacks effected the IRA’s/Sinn Fein’s negotiating position vis-a-vis the British government, IRA recruiting, financing, and the British government’s response (i.e. military response, legislation)?

SMM: How would you go about getting data on this?

Professor Maurer, did the British policy of internment work in Northern Ireland? Should that policy be viewed as an anti-terror tactic or as a practice limited to a theater of war? I don’t recall if internment was part of a larger piece of emergency legislation, something like a State Emergency Protection Act, but I believe it was, is that right? Anyhow, I have heard that the United Kingdom and all of the former members of the Commonwealth, such as India and Australia, have some sort of comprehensive emergency legislation (that would make our Patriot Act look pretty tame). Is that true? If so, what is it called and when, if ever, has it been utilized? Did the British authorities act under such legislation following this summer’s London bombings.

SMM: It would be better to provide details. When you talk about internment, you're usually referring to guerilla war which is a different subject. The classical examples are British policy in Malaya and before that the Boer War. Moving populations is a familiar tactic which we talked about in lecture. It seems to work.

Professor Maurer made the point that terrorism has been around throughout history and that it seems to come in waves that exhaust themselves and then reappear with subsequent generations. The Economist had a rather good article on the subject of terrorism that more or less came to the same conclusion. The article gives a rather broad overview of terrorism, counterterrorism measures, and how terrorists have employed technology. I would highly recommend it. See Lessons from the 19th Century Anarchists, Aug. 18, 2005.

Lecture 2

Professor Maurer, you mentioned the recent London bombings and also the manner in which the citizens of Great Britain continued to soldier on perhaps more accustomed to dealing with such things given their experience with the IRA and during the Battle of Britain. I was in London this summer during the bombings and for a few weeks following. I think your discussion of London’s World War II experience as putting things in perspective was spot on. As an anecdote, I was in the City Point building the morning of the first bombings – about five blocks away from the Liverpool Street Station. About two hours after the bombings I was walking with a friend to another building and we took a couple of random turns and ended up on a small street across from the Barbican complex. Etched in the stone of one of the buildings on that street was (paraphrase) “At this spot, on August 24, 1940, at approximately 12am, the first bomb of WWII was dropped on the City of London.” It was a rather powerful chance find that day and really put things in perspective for me.

I should also add that, in the moments immediately following the blasts, the security authorities in London acting swiftly and expertly. Within less than ten minutes of the blast between the Liverpool and Aldersgate Stations, the police had cordoned off the City Point building up to a block away and were checking vehicles in the area for explosives. At about the same time two helicopters took to the air over Canary Wharf, where London’s newest and tallest office buildings are (headquarters of City Bank, HSBC, etc.). People were very concerned but there was never an air of panic. I would say that resilience, pride, and steadfastness are apt characterizations of the pulse of London in the first couple of weeks following the bombings.

On a different note, there was talk of a “covenant of security” that had existed prior to the bombings between British intelligence and security forces and Islamic terrorists. Evidently, there was an unspoken arrangement whereby the authorities would not harass, crack down on, arrest, or expel known Islamic terrorists (people known to be advocating or to have taken part in violence outside of the UK) so long as they did not commit acts on UK soil. Professor Maurer, have you heard anything about the “covenant of security”? Any thoughts?

SMM: It's logical for all governments to want a quiet life. The Europeans have been accused of having this sort of pact since the '70s, though the phrase "covenant" sounds like journalistic invention. The speed with which Germany cracked down in Hamburg suggests that the cops knew a lot about the radical community. But before 9/11 they were either politically constrained or had no desire to stir things up.

There was a major change of attitude amongst the authorities following the bombings too. Individuals who looked as if they might be of Middle or South Asian descent were frequently stopped, questioned, and carted off by authorities if they could not identify themselves with official or valid documentation or explain there presence adequately. In the UK, that was a huge change of policy. I had witnessed the Italian authorities do the same around Easter of 2001 in Rome and Venice but was a bit surprised to see the British implement much the same policy; from what I understand, the Italians and French are notorious for doing so.

Did the French actually kill Carlos the Jackal?

SMM: No, he's in jail.

Can you discuss the bombings that took place in France during the 1990s? Were they carried out by North African Islamists? If so, should they have been taken as a warning for what might be brewing and what might occur in other Western societies? How did the French react to the bombings, what sort of countermeasures did they take?

Professor Maurer, you discussed the internationalization of terror in the 1960s and 70s, could you discuss the recent, I believe in the last three years, existence of ties between the IRA and Columbian paramilitary groups?

Did the British ever directly fund the Unionist paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland as an anti-terrorism tactic?

SMM: I very much doubt it.

Should the violence involving Islamic groups in and around Achaea and in the Southern Philippines be viewed as emanating from struggles for independence and nationalism (similar to your categorization of IRA activity within the 32 counties) or acts of terrorism? Does it matter?

Would you count the SAS operation on the Iranian Embassy, in London, as the key turning point for Western specialized anti-terror units – was that the operation that was primarily responsible for showing the terrorists what they were now up against or was that just one of many such successful counter-terrorism actions (i.e. Germans in Mogadishu)?

SMM: What is a turning point?

Is residual tension over the handling of Aquila Lauro hijacking at all to blame for the Italian government’s intense condemnation (and insistence that CIA officers involved be tried as war criminals) of the recent US rendition of a terror suspect from Italy and its foot dragging with respect to handing over a suspect wanted in connection with the second/attempted London bombings?

Lecture 3

Dean Nacht mentioned the enormous Muslim population in India. Outside of the Kashmiri conflict, have the Indians encountered much Islamic terrorism? If so, should it be viewed as terrorism or was being made by Pakistan on a different front? If there have been such actions, how has India reacted? I am interested, particularly, because India is a democracy and because much of the Indian government and legislation was modeled on the British system.

Would the first group of London bombers be considered al Qaeda proper or an al Qaeda franchise? I believe the group used a name similar to or the same as the group the conducted the Madrid bombings – were they linked in a significant way?

Are there any public examples of hoaxes initiated by al Qaeda?

Professor Maurer, you have stressed repeatedly that terrorist organizations are no match for state power when it is seriously brought to bear against them. In reference to the Vietnam War, Dean Nacht recalled a statement by a Vietnamese General that it is true that North Vietnam never defeated the Americans in battle but that that was “irrelevant” (relatedly, he also made the point that several groups that have gone on to have disproportionate impacts on societies were small and rather insignificant when compared to the state governments they maneuvered against). The Tet Offensive seems to be a good example of that line of thought. I understand that the Offensive was, in fact, a tremendous military defeat for the North Vietnamese but that the US media and public opinion effectively turned the Offensive into a massive strategic victory for the North Vietnamese. Could not the same thing happen with respect to the US and terrorism? The terrorists may never defeat US troops head to head or bring down the US state but their actions and the effects on public opinion that they may have can, potentially, have or contribute to real strategic effects (i.e. the US taking a much more active role in this part of the world, a less active role in that part, etc.). Thoughts?

SMM: Guerrilla wars are mass movements and different. I can have all sorts of thoughts about what might happen. The trick is to bring evidence to bear. I think I said everything I can say about this in the second lecture.

Lecture 4

With respect to the Kyllo case and search and seizure protections, does the Patriot Act include anything that would make it easier to monitor conduct or substances in a blanket fashion, or make it easier to get permission to do so – are there any time, place, and manner exceptions (like there are for free speech)?

In the case involving cocaine at the airport and the search being allowed because the person could have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to contraband, how important was it that the individual brought the contraband into a public environment? Did the Court mention if that was at all important?

Is the grand plan to combine sensors for different forms of WMD at ports into one “super-detector” (i.e. bringing together the work of Dr. Norman and others working on similar capabilities with respect to chemical and biological agent detection)? Is that feasible? Is there any coordination pushing towards that end today?

Perhaps a silly question, but are there any potential side effects to pumping neutrons through items in a shipping container (i.e. food)?

Are scientists at the Nat’l Labs compensated in any additional way for developing such devices, those that are commercially viable and thus patented and manufactured for sale by a private firm? Do they think that they should be?

With respect to Dr. Prosnitz’s hypothetical, I think that if the device could be limited with design barriers to focus on solely contraband. Also, I would note that I don’t believe that the Yellow Alert or the super-general description of the threat would be enough to warrant use of a detection device without such design barriers; at least, not in the eyes of the Court, given the information provided to us in the presentation.

Lecture 5

Lecture 5

Dr. Bale, can you restate your definition of terrorism? Also, can you tell me what the name of the publication you were referencing during your presentation is and whether or not it is available to the general public?

Of the five types of non-state terrorist actors (i.e. ethno-nationalists, secular left-wing groups, secular right-wing groups, religious terrorist groups, and single-issue groups) has one been more violent, historically speaking, than the others?

Dr. Bale, would you mind going into a bit more of what you would have said, had you had time, concerning the motivations of different types of religious groups – it sounded as if you were forced to cut that aspect of your talk back a little? Also, could you say a bit more about the notion of “taboo transgressions.”

Who wrote the treatise on strategic terrorism?

Can you expand a little on the idea of legal sanctuary with respect to Japan, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, etc. Which specific laws in those states provide such sanctuary and which, if any, laws cut back in the opposite direction -- what is required for them to be utilized etc.? Have those countries swung in the other direction since so many serious terrorist activities have been uncovered (Jap. = Aum Shinrikyo, UK = London Bombings, Germany = Hamburg Cell, Netherlands = murder of Van Gogh, etc.)?

Is there evidence that Aum Shinrikyo ever attempted to purchase a nuclear device? Are the elements of that organization that still persist or has it been rendered wholly ineffective?

Has the US had the opportunity to interrogate A.Q. Khan yet?

Can you provide some specific examples of government stings that attempted to catch people seeking WMD?

Dr. Bale, do you put any stock into the notion that Islamist attacks have been more brutal and dehumanizing as a result of sexual repression caused by adherence to strict religious observation?

How closely linked were or are the different Islamic Jihads and Muslim Brotherhoods that exist in various states (i.e. Egypt, Palestine, etc.)?

Is the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade sanctioned by Fatah (PLO/PA) or is it a radical offshoot?

Were Hamas, the PLO, and the PFLP all funded by the same states and groups or not? If not, where were their respective funding and support streams coming from?