Talk:Lecture 4
With respect to the Kyllo case and search and seizure protections, does the Patriot Act include anything that would make it easier to monitor conduct or substances in a blanket fashion, or make it easier to get permission to do so – are there any time, place, and manner exceptions (like there are for free speech)?
In the case involving cocaine at the airport and the search being allowed because the person could have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to contraband, how important was it that the individual brought the contraband into a public environment? Did the Court mention if that was at all important?
Is the grand plan to combine sensors for different forms of WMD at ports into one “super-detector” (i.e. bringing together the work of Dr. Norman and others working on similar capabilities with respect to chemical and biological agent detection)? Is that feasible? Is there any coordination pushing towards that end today?
Perhaps a silly question, but are there any potential side effects to pumping neutrons through items in a shipping container (i.e. food)?
Are scientists at the Nat’l Labs compensated in any additional way for developing such devices, those that are commercially viable and thus patented and manufactured for sale by a private firm? Do they think that they should be?
With respect to Dr. Prosnitz’s hypothetical, I think that if the device could be limited with design barriers to focus on solely contraband. Also, I would note that I don’t believe that the Yellow Alert or the super-general description of the threat would be enough to warrant use of a detection device without such design barriers; at least, not in the eyes of the Court, given the information provided to us in the presentation.
Active interrogation as detonator?
Dr. Norman's excellent lecture made me wonder whether someone could use active interrogation of containers to start a nuclear chain reaction. Could someone arrange things such that a mass of 235U around critical mass is just waiting for the thermal neutrons from a "nuclear car wash" to initiate a nuclear chain reaction?
Even if the thermal neutrons cannot be made to cause a chain reaction directly, I wonder whether they could still provide useful information to an attacker. One of the difficult things for an attacker, I presume, is to know when exactly to detonate a bomb. An important port is a good target. A gamma ray detector within the container could be the trigger for a more conventional gun-type nuclear bomb. There are certainly other ways for the bomb to determine its location, but they typically involve either electromagnetic communication through the container or monitoring and intervention by a human.
Parvez Anandam, 9/24/05
SMM: Nice idea, I heard a bunch of physicists say the same thing the first time I heard the talk. And no, there aren't enough neutrons. Personally I think GPS or a motion switch would be a lot easier. Particularly since it would be even better to ship the container downtown than have it blow up at the Port.
To add to this conversation, I had a similar query, if not more general. It's a very basic question asked of any new device or technology, but I feel it is pertinent. If we're going to spend a total of $1 billion on nuclear detection devices around the globe, how certain are we that they will work all or most of the time? How fool-proof is this "nuclear car wash?"
At the beginning of Don Prosnitz's presentation, he stated that technology can be used for our defense, but that is also something to fear when in the wrong hands. Just as it is with savvy computer hackers, we might be able to defend against their viruses and hacking, but eventually they will find a way to break our defenses. Can't the same be said of the nuclear car wash? What steps have been made to make sure that terrorists or others planning on detonating nuclear material don't find a loophole in this security system?
If there's any flaw in the device at all, is it wise to spend $1 billion? I suppose it depends on how large the flaw is, how possible it is for the system to be broken. But if a break is made at even one major port, the cost could be catastrophic. Should we look at this as a "glass-is-half-full" deal, because we have at least some form of efficient protection around the world?-Sean Cardeno
