Soft Targets:Countermeasures
DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION OF A PLANNED ATTACK
Soft targets by their very definition are difficult to defend against attack. The very best defense may in fact be a good offense as in the use of Intelligence assets to discover terrorist before they strike. Intelligence Agencies (with enhanced authority granted from the Patriot Act) such as the CIA, NSA, and FBI can zero in on potential terrorist by monitoring communications, tracking financial transactions and information gained form human sources. When suspected terrorist members have been identified, covert surveillance can watch their activities and possible infiltrate the organization. “Sting” operations can be used such as those that lure terror suspects into a situation where they unknowingly arrange to purchase illegal weapons from undercover agents.
Information on the US Department of Justice website(1) Cites the success of the Act in disrupting over 150 domestic and foreign terrorist threats and cells, the killing or capturing of nearly 2/3 of Al-Qaida’s known senior leadership.More then 3,000 operatives have been incapacitated world wide. Five terrorist cells in Portland, Buffalo, Detroit, Seattle, and North Virginia have been broken up. 401 individuals in the US have been criminally charged. 212 individuals in the US have been convicted or have pled guilty. 515 Individuals linked to the 9-11 Investigation have been removed from the US. A 30% increase in sources of human intelligence related to domestic terror. A 63% increase in sources of human intelligence related to foreign intelligence. Increase in the quality of both foreign and domestic intelligence sources, and the freezing of 136 Million Dollars in assets worldwide.
RESPONSE TO AN ACTUAL ATTACK
If a plan to attack a soft target avoids these initial defenses then the front shifts to the target itself. Chula Vista High School (CVHS) with its minimal security procedures is a good example of how a public school presents an inviting “Soft Target” to terrorist.The primary responsibility of the CVHS security staff is the safety of the students. Moving the students away from the threat or into a position of safety is of the greatest importance if under attack. There are two main ways to accomplish this, evacuation procedures and lockdowns Evacuation would be enacted in the case of a bomb threat and a lockdown in the event of a “Active Shooter” on campus where students and staff barricade themselves inside class rooms. This is intended to reduce the number of “targets” outside and makes the attacker stand out to law enforcement since in theory, only the attacker will be outside the buildings.
If the attacker enters an occupied classroom the teacher would be better prepared if trained in hostage situation psychology dos and don’ts and critical decision making under stress conditions. Students and teachers may be isolated in their classrooms for extended periods of time in the event of a lock down. A wise classroom preparation would be having at least a minimum supply of water, food rations, first aid supplies, flash lights, radio and batteries. These items should be placed in back packs or fanny packs (in case the class need to move to another location for safety reasons) and stored inside an emergency locker in each classroom.
In the event of a major incident at CVHS local authorities could receive mutual aide support in a matter of minutes from the large nearby police and fire agencies of both San Diego City and County. State and Federal Agencies would likely join the effort in the event of a protracted situation. Realistic multi agency emergency drills involving a simulated attack at CVHS, practicing the procedures that would be used during a real incident should be performed to obtain proficiency, identify problems areas, and eliminate costly mistakes in a forgiving setting.
The East Side Unified School District in San Jose, Ca held a armed intruder drill at Overfelt High School in 2000 involving multiple law enforcement agencies, teachers, students, parents, the media, and support services. According to Carla Holtzclaw (from the Eastside Unified district's Office of Safety in Schools) when schools have a "Code Red" or lockdown because of an armed intruder on campus, teachers are typically told to lock their doors and wait to be rescued . "This creates a victim mentality. We wanted teachers to develop a survivor mentality. It's hard, because teachers are trained to be teachers, not SWAT officers".(2)
Thailand and Israel have armed teachers with firearms and there have been successes in these countries.(3)There are however, serious drawbacks to such a plan in US society which could increase the danger to all. Teachers do not automatically come equipped with knowledge necessary to safely and effectively handle firearms. A Teacher with back turned while writing on the chalkboard creates a dangerous opportunity for a student to take the teachers gun away and endanger everyone present. Armed Teachers without tactical experience may have tragic results when confronting the “normal” schoolyard incidents including accidental discharges and incorrect decisions to use deadly force. An armed disgruntled teacher may become the attacker.Teachers responding to a threat, dressed in civilian clothes and holding a gun might accidentally get shot by confused law enforcement personal. Likewise, an officer might hesitate in a critical reaction if unsure that an armed subject is a teacher or an attacker. Getting everyone out of the way of the law enforcement search for the attacker is a key ingredient of the lockdown concept.
In the event of a armed attack or suicide bomber there is little that the two CVHS unarmed security staff members could do. The unarmed security staff would likely have the greatest impact on prevention thru awareness, and if attacked in leading evacuation and lockdown procedures. There have been cases in the US where a heroic unarmed person at the scene of an “Active Shooter” incident has seized an opportunistic moment to physically restrain and disarm a shooter as in the Hudson Valley Mall shooting in 2005 but this is obviously very difficult to do.(4)
Even when schools have armed police or armed security on site at the time of an attack the results have not always been successful. At Columbine and Beslan the armed defenders of the schools were at an extreme tactical disadvantage. They were overwhelmed by the planning, preparation, superior firepower, numerical superiority(Beslan), of the attackers and the element of surprise. At Columbine the deputy assigned as school security was armed with a hand gun and engaged Harris who was armed with a rifle(5). At Beslan the armed security force of about a half dozen faced 32 heavily armed attackers. 5 security members were killed in the initial confrontation as compared to 1 attacker killed.(6)Once again,armed security and police can achieve the best results with their ability to safely and effectively detain and investigate suspicious (possible armed) subjects before they launch an attack.
Police performing campus security do have several advantages over security staff. Police have broader legal authority in stopping and questioning suspicious people. Police have the ability to check vehicle license plates and persons against criminal data bases for safety alerts, arrest warrants, stay away orders, sexual registrant status, probation and parole status, gang affiliation, and prior criminal history. Because of their training and equipment, police are in better position to deal with potentially armed and dangerous subjects. During an emergency, on site police can communicate directly via police radios with the emergency dispatcher and other officers saving critical time as opposed to having to work thru the 911 system which is likely to be jammed with many callers trying to report the same emergency. For these reasons campus police are likely to be the first target of an organized school attack. This misfortune may still possible save lives even in defeat, by “buying time” for emergency procedures to be activated.
In 1997 outgunned LAPD officers borrowed high powered rifles from a locale gun store to confront heavily armed bank robbers. Police Administrators across the country slowly started to change their attitude about arming regular patrol officers with assault weapons. The thinking went from its too militaristic and would represent a scary image to the public to one of tactical necessity.(7) By 1999 many urban areas had equipped patrol cars with assault riffles but in peaceful Columbine the necessity for such changes had not been foreseen. The 1999 Columbine massacre brought home the fact that large scale violence can happen anywhere and forced the re-evaluation of Law Enforcement response procedures to “Active Shooter” events. This resulted in the wide spread use of the LAPD Immediate Tactical Deployment Model.(8)
Establishing a containment perimeter while a SWAT team is assembled to conduct a slow methodical building to building search is an obsolete procedure. When lives our being lost, the “contain and wait for SWAT philosophy has been deemed to slow in ending the active threat to the students. The strategy now is to have the first responding officers immediately form tactical teams instead of a containment perimeter. The officers then directly respond to the part of the campus they hear the shots being fired.
ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES
CVHS does have some procedures in place such as the requirement of all vehicles parked on school property to display placards. All students are required to posses ID cards and all visitors must get passes from the office. All School staff undergo a background during the hiring process. A key vulnerability remains access control and perimeter monitoring issues. Requiring all students, staff and visitors to wear visible ID cards would enhance the ability to spot unauthorized intruders. Of course all these measures can be defeated (fences can be climbed over, ID cards can be stolen or forged) but any overt action that draws attention to the terrorist Increases the chance that someone will notice a “Red Flag” and begin to investigate or activate an emergency response procedure. Even a two minute increase in warning time can make significant difference in evacuation or lock down procedures and the arrival times of emergency responders.
Campus security checks at night and on weekends are essential to protect against the planting of bombs or the theft of resources during off hours. Maintenance, custodians, and groundskeepers should all receive training in the identification and safe reaction to bombs that might be hidden on campus. Additional security improvements include the monitoring (staff or video) of the schools parking facilities for any sign of illegal activity or suspicious behavior. Vehicles without current and valid registration or school placards, rental vehicles, vehicles with signs of forced entry (shattered windows, punched locks, stripped ignitions) are all cases that require closer scrutiny. CVHS would be well served to arrange for campus security assessment by an expert in the field (private sector Campus Security Consultant, Local Law Enforcement etc). All Staff members should be knowledgeable of the safety polices and procedures.
Detecting and responding to suspicious activities plays a vital role in the schools defense. One of the most efficient means to accomplish this is the use of surveillance cameras. The effectiveness of security cameras has long been appreciated in private industry and now finding increasing acceptance in the public arena. The appeal is that the same 2 staff members assigned to security duties at CVHS could monitor the whole school district from a control room in the school district office via video cameras covering the perimeters, common areas, and access points of all the district campuses."Still photos" can be developed as evidence of incidents and used to identify suspicious vehicles license plates that are possible conducting surveillance or other suspicious activity on or near a campus.
Another valuable resource are the people who live and work near CVHS such as home owners, mail carriers, waste collectors, delivery people and fitness walkers. They all are in a position to the eyes and ears looking out for suspicious activity near the school. School administrators could simply hold a meeting once every four months with the local residences and businesses to coordinate the neighborhood awareness program This is not only a tool against a soft target attack on the school but helpful in matters such as drug dealing and drug use, child abduction, sex crimes, and illegal street gang activity.Security measures that pay multiple dividends are wise investments.
In 2001 a real life example of response to suspicious activity saved lives in San Jose, Ca. A Longs Drug store photo clerk noticed a disturbing picture of a subject posing with assault weapons and bombs. She called police who arrested the films owner. A search of his home resulted in the discovery of a detailed plan to launch a Columbine style attack on De Anza Community College. The subject was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to prison, the school was unharmed and a tragedy averted thanks to her alert actions.(9))
ESTIMATED LOSSES
If a terrorist does attack CVHS the possible losses depend on variables such as the type of attack used, the severity and duration of the attack. The highest potential for loss of life lies in the densely populated events held in a confined space such as a school assembly in the gymnasium. A powerful bomb blast or multiple bomb attack could have horrific consequences in that setting with the possibility of up to 100% causality rate. An arson attack (elaborately planned) could destroy the entire school with resulting financial cost greater then the cost of initially building the school. The emotional effect upon the survivors of a attack is harder to measure but can be absolutely devastating with the victims scarred for life.
(1) U.S. Department of Justice. "Preserving Life and Liberty." http://www.lifeandliberty.gov
(2) "Operation: Safe School." California Educator. Vol. 5, No. 3. November, 2000. http://www.cta.org/CaliforniaEducator/v5i3/Feature_3.htm
(3) Kopel, Dave. "Follow the Leader." National Review Online. September 2, 2004. http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopel200409022215.asp
(4) Bonapartis, Nick, and Oluwa, Rasheed. "Gunman opens fire in mall." Poughkeepsie Journal. February 14, 2005. http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/etc/mallshooting/po021405s2.shtml
(5) "School Safety, Resources, Columbine Shooting." knowgangs.com. http://www.knowgangs.com/school_resources/menu_003.htm
(6) "Beslan school hostage crisis." Wikipedia. Visited December, 2005. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beslan_hostage_crisis
(7) Lloyd, Jillian. "Change in tactics: Police trade talk for rapid response." Christian Science Monitor. May 31, 2000. http://csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/durableRedirect.pl?/durable/2000/05/31/fp2s2-csm.shtml
(8) Macko, Steve. "Lessons learned from the Columbine massacre." ERRI Emergency Report. Vol. 3. August 20, 1999. http://www.emergency.com/1999/co-anlys.htm
(9) Mullins, Robert. Officers, Cleark Honored. Silicon Valley/San Jose Journal. February 2, 2001. http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2001/01/29/daily58.html
