Soft Targets:Adversaries

Knowing the enemy is a cardinal rule of battle; unfortunately, perpetrators of school attacks fit a set of profiles as diverse as the populations of the schools themselves. Rather than attempt a specific socioeconomic profile, we can categorize attackers by their origin and aims. They can be domestic or foreign in origin; for our purposes we consider a citizen of the state allied with a foreign organization to be a foreign perpetrator. Domestic attackers can further be grouped into students and non-students, i.e. domestic paramilitary or extremist persons and organizations.

Although as a student, the chances of being killed in a school shooting are only one in six million, fear has risen as the United States has seen a rash of domestic incidents perpetrated by students. According to the Secret Service, these attackers have a high variance in their demographics; both Advanced Placement students and those on the brink of failure, rich and poor, black and white, functional and dysfunctional families. However, their primary motivation in over half of cases cited by the Secret Service appears to be revenge and retaliation [18], rather than the traditional terrorist aim of bringing attention to a plight or furthering a cause. Two-thirds of perpetrators in cases cited in the same survey [18] were victims of bullying, and many were suicidal.

However, administrators should take care not to assume that these are the only causes. The official FBI psychological profile of Harris and Klebold, perpetrators of the Columbine attack, concludes that they were, quite simply, psychopaths [6]. Similarly, (then) 17-year-old Brenda Spencer, who opened fire at at Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego in 1979, stated that she "just did it for fun" [16]. In both cases, no group of students in particular was targeted. The indiscriminate nature of firing and IEDs used in the Columbine attacks and random nature of shootings in the Spencer case, as well as many others, support the lack of specific targets. Notably, Harris and Klebold intended to produce a violent event much more significant [9] than any other “school shooting,” and this aligns then with terrorism more so than a wayward individual.

Much unlike the discreet terrorist operatives of domestic paramilitary and foreign organizations, in many cases the student attackers clearly state their intentions to some of their peers. In cases such as Erfut, Germany [5] in 2002 and Columbine [9] in 1999, attackers disclosed their plans on the Internet. These prior claims of intent are often lost in general disbelief or the noise of the daily routine. To filter this noise, school officials must learn to differentiate a threat of violence from the ability and commitment to perform it.

Students have a unique advantage in that they have insider knowledge the physical and psychological infrastructures of the target. Attack planning can skip the observation and monitoring phase and proceed directly into threat modeling and operations. This advantage is not limited to students; among other cases, in 2001, a former janitor attacked students with a knife in Osaka, Japan [1], and a doorman at a kindergarten stabbed fifteen children and three teachers in Beijing, China, in 2004 [12]. Besides knowledge of the physical buildings, insiders are less likely to be considered suspect by other members of the school community. To combat this, school districts and schools increasingly use background checks to qualify candidates prior to hiring them. Such checks may have prevented both stabbings presented here; each attacker had a history of crime and/or mental illness. It will not prevent employees of contractors, who often have open access to school infrastructure, from attempting attacks unless the contractor also enforces background checks, although some schools have also added this requirement as well. In general, the domestic adult school attacker, unaffiliated with respect to terrorism, is a portrait of mental instability, rather than a revenge seeker.

Since terrorist operatives not affiliated with the school or community will typically not have full open access to school facilities, administrators should be aware of surveillance activities, such as individuals seeking site plans for schools, bus routes, attendance lists; observing security and/or fire drills, using fake identities such as flower delivery persons, newspaper vendors, or street sweepers; discreetly using cameras, video cameras or taking notes around the premises, and questioning faculty and ancillary staff [10].

While schools are a tempting target to traditional terrorist organizations like al Qaeda and Chechen insurgents, in the United States, there have yet to be any incidents. Worldwide, however, foreign schools and students have been targets of terrorists comprising the vast majority [8] of school terrorist attacks over the last century. Most of these occurred in or near Israel resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, the most recent and arguably worst atrocity occurred in Beslan, Chechnya in 2004. For foreign terror organizations, the school is simply another instrument in a wider insurgency, and hence the attackers themselves tend to fit the general profile of a foreign terrorist.

Operatives are typically young male fanatics easily motivated to perform their crimes [11]. Nationalistic tendencies or socioeconomic disadvantages may compound characteristically antisocial behavior. In attacking schools they are almost always members of larger organizations, historically including groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Chechen rebels, or the Maoist insurgency (in Nepal). Interestingly, multinational organizations that would target the United States, such as al-Qaeda, have not yet attacked a school; in 2004, a public emergency preparedness manual for San Diego Public Schools was found on a captive in Iraq but both the federal government and district administration claimed there was no "direct threat" [4].

Domestic paramilitary or extremist organizations may also target schools, although this seems less likely than foreign terrorist groups or individuals attackers. Any group with an agenda can target schools that teach curricula deemed to be offensive or contrary to the group’s beliefs. For example, neo-facist hate groups may target Jewish schools, as in Los Angeles (1999) [17] or religious groups may conflict over schools, as in Belfast (2001) [19]. Local profiling of terrorist or extremist organizations will likely be beneficial; for Chula Vista, white supremacist organizations targeting diversity may pose a threat. Administrators may wish to take care in choosing their mock attackers when considering possible attackers and creating emergency drills; in Muskegon, Michigan in 2004, the county held an emergency drill to deal with attacks from "Wackos Against Schools and Education," a fictional group of home schooling advocates; actual home schoolers and conservatives were not amused [3].

Once attackers have chosen a target, they can arm themselves in a variety of ways. Foreign attackers usually receive weapons and munitions financed by the umbrella organization rather than self-financing, whereas domestic attackers assemble their weapon cache using their own individual or group finances or through straw purchases. Attackers acting individually, especially in the United States, may already own a significant quantity of handguns and rifles. Student shooters can leverage their relatives’ access to guns, as in Jonesboro, Arkansas (1998) [7] and Carmen de Patagones, Argentina (2004) [2].

School administrators should not assume that the damage caused by one group or individual would be more or less than others; the Chechen incident in Beslan arrived in a Gaz-66 armored vehicle [13] that is not easy to acquire; Columbine attackers Harris and Klebold arrived in cars. The Chechen attackers set mines and trip wires [15] while Harris and Klebold used improvised propane bombs [9]. Although the Chechens were better armed, it is unclear if their intention was to actually cause mass casualties, as was the case in Columbine. The key differentiator in motivation is hostage taking versus life-taking; however, in many hostage situations including Beslan and Ma’alot, Isreal (1974) [14] the hostage situation creates the loss of life during rescue attempts.

Although homeland security spending levels, fear, uncertainty, and doubt, have spread after the September 11, 2001, attacks, school attacks related to international terrorism have not increased. Rather, the largest danger to American schools, teachers, and staff remains the individual lone gunman or small group. They can acquire weapons fairly easily, have extensive domain knowledge of the target, and are not easily detected. Their backgrounds are highly variable, but most show significant signs of antisocial behavior and/or depression. On the other hand, foreign terrorist organizations still pose a threat and administrators should remain vigilant against surveillance and infiltration opportunities.

References

• [1] “8 students killed in knife attack 13 others, 2 teachers injured as Osaka man runs amok at school.” The Daily Yomiuri [Tokyo, Japan]. June 9, 2001.
• [2] Arias, Carols. “Sufren en Argentina su propio Columbine.” Reforma [Mexico City, Mexico]. September 29, 2004.
• [3] Associated Press. “Protests surround Muskegon County terrorist drill casting homeschoolers as enemies.” September 22, 2004.
• [4] Cavanagh, Sean. “Man Detained in Iraq With U.S. Guide on School Crisis Plans. Education Week. Vol. 24, No. 6. October 10, 2004.
• [5] Connolly, Kate. “Gunman ‘spoke of killings on net’.” The Guardian [London, England]. May 6, 2002.
• [6] Cullen, Dave. “The Depressive and the Psychopath.” Slate. April 20, 2004.
• [7] Davis, Sandy, and Porter, Jeff. “Illness faked, the weapons were gathered.” Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. March 26, 1998.
• [8] Dorn, Michael and Dorn, Christopher. Innocent Targets: When Terrorism Comes to School. Macon: Safe Havens International, 2005.
• [9] Federal Bureau of Investigation. Records released under FOIPA request number 0952958-000. Washington, D.C. August 29, 2003.
• [10] Hickok, Eugene W. Open letter to U.S. Educators after Beslan attacks. October 6, 2004.
• [11] Laqueur, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Continuum, 2003.
• [12] Li, Wendy. “1 dead, 17 injured in nursery attack; Kindergarten gatekeeper detained after stabbings in Beijing.” South China Morning Post [Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China]. August 5, 2004.
• [13] Marelov, Mikhail. “Hostage takers in N. Ossetia put forward demands.” Daily News Bulletin [Moscow, Russia]. September 1, 2004.
• [14] MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Attacked Private Citizens & Property Target (May 15,1974, Israel).” April 3, 2001. http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=1275.
• [15] Page, Jeremy and Smith, Sebastian. “Children in the frontline of Russia’s war on terror.” The Times [London, England]. September 2, 2004.
• [16] “San Diego Girl Slays 2 With Rifle And Wounds 9 on School Grounds.” New York Times. January 30, 1979.
• [17] Van Derbeken, Jaxon, and Hallissy, Erin. “Day-Camp Shooting Drama.” San Francisco Chronicle. August 11, 1999.
• [18] Vossekuil, B, et al. U.S.S.S. Safe School Initiative: An Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted Violence in Schools. Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, National Thread Assessment Center, 2000.
• [19] Wallace, Bruce. “Bomb hurled at schoolgirls: Even Protestant leaders condemn action against young Cathloic students.” The Vancouver Sun. September 6, 2001.