Difference between revisions of "WP 11"
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| − | + | Technology Employed by DHS | |
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| − | + | The Science and Technology Directorate (S&TD) cooperates with Federal, State and Local governments to prevent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons from entering the country. It facilitates the transfer of technology from developers to the Department. Lawrence Livermore and Lockheed Martin are two defense companies that work with DHS to do research that helps protect the nation’s infrastructure from nuclear attacks. The following pages introduce a few technologies researched by governmental labs to detect potential radiation hazards, and then go on to evaluate their effectiveness. | |
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| − | + | LLNL’s Detection and Tracking System (DTS) uses dispersed sensors to track radiological and nuclear materials being tracked on roads and highways in the US. The DTS uses remote sensors to give early warning for potential threats. It consists of a network of nodes linked by wireless communication to a command location, which contain sensors that measure gamma rays and neutrons. As potential threats that are traveling through a network are scanned, traffic information extrapolates the expected path the vehicle will take. Neutron sensors are also employed for this purpose. This provides law enforcement with a way to intercept potential hazards. | |
| − | + | As the name suggests, the strength of detection networks is in their networked nature. A nuclear signal’s strength diminishes exponentially as it is positioned progressively further away from the detector. Networking increases the potential of each sensor to facilitate detection. For example, if the sensors are set for 350 counts per second, and a device which emits 50 counts per second is passed through the sensor, the 300 counts per second from the background radation will combine with the 50 from the device, alerting the sensor. If another sensor is activated, monitors can extrapolate the path of potential hazards. However, in spite of such innovations, the technology is not “intelligent” enough. The sensors used on detection networks are not always able to distinguish threatening targets from normal background radiation that is not being used for nuclear terrorism. The real sensors put into place are more complicated than the models; calculating algorithms for 100 sensors takes a lot of computing power! | |
| − | -Gamma Ray Spectroscopy | + | Cargo container screening is also a LLNL technology in use by the DHS. A facility called ICONEX is part of an attempt to detect WMD’s and dirty bombs. It was designed for the purpose of testing radiation detection technology against realistic threats. This facility helps various agencies with cargo screening. A system called ARAM (Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor) is a very sensitive portable detection system that is ideal for monitoring relatively small movable items, such as cargo. The ARAM system currently designed screens objects that pass by a portal and detects any radionuclides that may be present. |
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| + | Last year, the Washington Post reported mixed results of such systems. According to the article, ABC News was able to successfully import depleted uranium into the country in lead containers. They say that depleted uranium “can be legally imported and gives off a radiation signature similar to that of highly enriched uranium.” | ||
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| + | Polymeric Chain Reaction Devices | ||
| + | Raman spectrophotometers | ||
| + | spectroscopy-based radiation portal monitors | ||
| + | neutron detectors | ||
| + | high energy x-ray interrogation systems | ||
| + | neutron interrogation systems | ||
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| + | Gamma Ray Spectroscopy | ||
Aluminum Antimonide Radiation Detectors | Aluminum Antimonide Radiation Detectors | ||
RadNet Cell Phones | RadNet Cell Phones | ||
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Ultra High Resolution Spectrometers | Ultra High Resolution Spectrometers | ||
| − | + | Gamma Ray Imaging | |
| − | + | Neutron Detection | |
| − | + | Antineutrino Detection | |
Protection from Dirty Bombs | Protection from Dirty Bombs | ||
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Latest revision as of 06:53, 6 December 2005
Technology Employed by DHS
The Science and Technology Directorate (S&TD) cooperates with Federal, State and Local governments to prevent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons from entering the country. It facilitates the transfer of technology from developers to the Department. Lawrence Livermore and Lockheed Martin are two defense companies that work with DHS to do research that helps protect the nation’s infrastructure from nuclear attacks. The following pages introduce a few technologies researched by governmental labs to detect potential radiation hazards, and then go on to evaluate their effectiveness.
LLNL’s Detection and Tracking System (DTS) uses dispersed sensors to track radiological and nuclear materials being tracked on roads and highways in the US. The DTS uses remote sensors to give early warning for potential threats. It consists of a network of nodes linked by wireless communication to a command location, which contain sensors that measure gamma rays and neutrons. As potential threats that are traveling through a network are scanned, traffic information extrapolates the expected path the vehicle will take. Neutron sensors are also employed for this purpose. This provides law enforcement with a way to intercept potential hazards.
As the name suggests, the strength of detection networks is in their networked nature. A nuclear signal’s strength diminishes exponentially as it is positioned progressively further away from the detector. Networking increases the potential of each sensor to facilitate detection. For example, if the sensors are set for 350 counts per second, and a device which emits 50 counts per second is passed through the sensor, the 300 counts per second from the background radation will combine with the 50 from the device, alerting the sensor. If another sensor is activated, monitors can extrapolate the path of potential hazards. However, in spite of such innovations, the technology is not “intelligent” enough. The sensors used on detection networks are not always able to distinguish threatening targets from normal background radiation that is not being used for nuclear terrorism. The real sensors put into place are more complicated than the models; calculating algorithms for 100 sensors takes a lot of computing power!
Cargo container screening is also a LLNL technology in use by the DHS. A facility called ICONEX is part of an attempt to detect WMD’s and dirty bombs. It was designed for the purpose of testing radiation detection technology against realistic threats. This facility helps various agencies with cargo screening. A system called ARAM (Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor) is a very sensitive portable detection system that is ideal for monitoring relatively small movable items, such as cargo. The ARAM system currently designed screens objects that pass by a portal and detects any radionuclides that may be present.
Last year, the Washington Post reported mixed results of such systems. According to the article, ABC News was able to successfully import depleted uranium into the country in lead containers. They say that depleted uranium “can be legally imported and gives off a radiation signature similar to that of highly enriched uranium.”
Polymeric Chain Reaction Devices Raman spectrophotometers spectroscopy-based radiation portal monitors neutron detectors high energy x-ray interrogation systems neutron interrogation systems
Gamma Ray Spectroscopy Aluminum Antimonide Radiation Detectors RadNet Cell Phones Mechanically cooled Germanium spectrometers Ultra High Resolution Spectrometers
Gamma Ray Imaging
Neutron Detection
Antineutrino Detection
Protection from Dirty Bombs
Lockheed Martin NBC Defense Systems
Chemical Biological and Radiological Early Warning System
Building Protection System Integration
Advanced NBC Filtration Systems
