Team 1 Main

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Revision as of 02:11, 24 October 2005 by Yi-Kai (talk | contribs) (Reply to Section 3.2)

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Areas - Names

Elena

1.1 Vulnerabilities exposed Santtu, Parvez, Elena

1.2 Estimated difficulty Elena

1.3 Estimated feasibility of defending against other similar attacks in the future Elena

1.4 Recommended policy responses Elena

These are drafts, I amd still revising and summarizing.

  • 2 Estimated damaged cause by attack on...

Parvez, Jameel

Outline of ideas for section 2, and draft of this section - Jameel, Parvez : Team_1_Sec2

2.1 Home computer

2.2 Corporate computer

2.3 Financial Sector computer


  • 3 Feasibility and strategic value of attach technique to terrorists

Yi-Kai, Pravin

3.1 Scalability (Pravin)

3.2 Technical and Financial resources (Yi-Kai)

3.3 Potential for achieving aims from lectures 1, 2, 3, and/or 5 (Pravin/Yi-Kai)

I'm working on revisions to my sections, and merging together Section 3. Pravin, I think what you wrote for 3.1 actually fits better in 3.3. Some of my section 3.2 overlaps with 3.1. I'll post a draft of Section 3 by tomorrow (Sunday) afternoon. --Yi-Kai

[Pravin] It is ok to have over-lap as far it is appears to one stapled job and consitent theme. I have posted the first draft on section 3.3 let me know your feedback. How is 3.2 going? [Pravin]

I promise, 3.2 is almost done. BTW, for 3.3, I'm thinking of splitting it into two sections, because your version of 3.3 focuses on attacks on critical infrastructure, while my version of 3.3 focuses on "annoyance" attacks (and why a terrorist group might still be interested in such attacks). Is it okay if we split 3.3? Also, could you please add references to your sections, for the quotes and other detailed information that you include? --Yi-Kai

3.2 is done (follow the link above). --Yi-Kai

Please refer to the above link for the final merged Section 4.

Home and Corporate - Hema

Financial - Santtu

Please ignore the links below. They are drafts.

4.1 Incentives for installing defenses

4.2 Adequacy of incentives

4.3 Cost-effectiveness

4.4 Lowest cost provider

4.5 Policy levers


  • 5 Programming of attack

Parvez, Santtu