Talk:Lecture 8
Biological Epidemics
Chris Fleizach - Recently, scientists in the Maryland decoded the 1918 influenza genome that killed millions of Americans and published the results in Nature. In fact, there was a meeting with national security advisors and the editors to determine if the material should be published at all. In the end, they decided the benefits of open publication outweighed the bio-terrorism risk. Then Bill Joy and Ray Kurzweil came out with a blistering editorial about giving away all the necessary information to bioterrorists to unleash their own flu epidemic. So is it really easy to recreate viruses as long as you know the DNA sequence? This also addresses the same topic that many discussions have touched upon: should there be open access to research material? Richard Muller's article speculating Al Quaeda was behind the anthrax attacks seemed to point they had given up bio-terrorism in some sense. With the flu genome decoded, avian flu being hyped up, what does this mean for America in terms of focus?
Altin Dastmalchi, UCB I think that declassifying information and putting it on the internet is risky but on the other hand could also help the world of science. As scientist, or anyone for that matter shares findings, results, etc, others who are just one process short from a new invention can search and find articles of the same topic and possibly enhance their own projects. So in short, sharing information leads to more scientific success. Furthermore, although i do believe that some terrorist could easily read the information, i also beleive that if they really wanted to get more info on a give topic then they can through some means. I.E. steal it from a lab. So in this case the success out ways the threat.
Anyone else agree?
What can the government do to combat CBNR attacks?
I found it interesting that both speakers saw the main role of security policy not in implementing particular defenses or managing terrorism response units with particular capabilites, but in espionage and police work. I guess that this is because there are such a wide range of methods possible to use for CBNR attacks, it might be asking to much to try to educate the public (as in the nuclear fallout shelters and school trainings that happened during the cold war) or to plan responses to every possible crises situation (as Katrina response has proved). Since there are such a wide range of attacks, the most important thing in preventing the attacks, according to the speakers tonight, were that the individuals who are a threat be identified, and we find out from spying on them what methods their groups see as good means to attack. In the biological realm, I can imagine that there are a very wide range of possible pathogens, and the one that becomes an attack will probably not depend on too much more than what substances those groups will have access to, or which ones fit particularly well with an over-looked opportunity in the U.S. food system, etc. So maybe the cheapest and most effective way to defend ourselves against the right pathogen is to be at the terrorists' ear. This view would definitely simplify the role of DHS (maybe making it more able to be successful as a government beaurocracy). Should the DHS leave biological weapons to the CDC and nuclear defense to the DOD? --Jameel 01:37, 20 October 2005 (PDT)
