Difference between revisions of "Talk:Lecture 8"

Revision as of 02:24, 21 October 2005

Biological Epidemics

Chris Fleizach - Recently, scientists in the Maryland decoded the 1918 influenza genome that killed millions of Americans and published the results in Nature. In fact, there was a meeting with national security advisors and the editors to determine if the material should be published at all. In the end, they decided the benefits of open publication outweighed the bio-terrorism risk. Then Bill Joy and Ray Kurzweil came out with a blistering editorial about giving away all the necessary information to bioterrorists to unleash their own flu epidemic. So is it really easy to recreate viruses as long as you know the DNA sequence? This also addresses the same topic that many discussions have touched upon: should there be open access to research material? Richard Muller's article speculating Al Quaeda was behind the anthrax attacks seemed to point they had given up bio-terrorism in some sense. With the flu genome decoded, avian flu being hyped up, what does this mean for America in terms of focus?

Altin Dastmalchi, UCB I think that declassifying information and putting it on the internet is risky but on the other hand could also help the world of science. As scientist, or anyone for that matter shares findings, results, etc, others who are just one process short from a new invention can search and find articles of the same topic and possibly enhance their own projects. So in short, sharing information leads to more scientific success. Furthermore, although i do believe that some terrorist could easily read the information, i also beleive that if they really wanted to get more info on a give topic then they can through some means. I.E. steal it from a lab. So in this case the success out ways the threat.

Anyone else agree?

abc This reminds me of the similar (and very heated) debate over publishing security vulnerabilities. While the two are slightly different (vulns are more directly and easily exploitable), still, there are pros and cons on both sides. I would agree that the benefits of publication outweigh the risk - primarily because this information never will really end up being "secret" in the end anyway. As was said in the lectures last evening, the threat of bioterror is probably not as great as we'd like to think - the dead bodies pile up slower and there are so many unknowns involved in the process. For example, unleashing an agent for which there is no known immunization on a population, that is also highly contagious could end up backfiring by wiping out the terrorists themselves. A plane full of jet fuel not only has more energy than TNT, but it also probably can scare a lot more people when flown into a large urban area like on 9/11...

What can the government do to combat CBNR attacks?

I found it interesting that both speakers saw the main role of security policy not in implementing particular defenses or managing terrorism response units with particular capabilites, but in espionage and police work. I guess that this is because there are such a wide range of methods possible to use for CBNR attacks, it might be asking to much to try to educate the public (as in the nuclear fallout shelters and school trainings that happened during the cold war) or to plan responses to every possible crises situation (as Katrina response has proved). Since there are such a wide range of attacks, the most important thing in preventing the attacks, according to the speakers tonight, were that the individuals who are a threat be identified, and we find out from spying on them what methods their groups see as good means to attack. In the biological realm, I can imagine that there are a very wide range of possible pathogens, and the one that becomes an attack will probably not depend on too much more than what substances those groups will have access to, or which ones fit particularly well with an over-looked opportunity in the U.S. food system, etc. So maybe the cheapest and most effective way to defend ourselves against the right pathogen is to be at the terrorists' ear. This view would definitely simplify the role of DHS (maybe making it more able to be successful as a government beaurocracy). Should the DHS leave biological weapons to the CDC and nuclear defense to the DOD? --Jameel 01:37, 20 October 2005 (PDT)

Fuel Oil

--Dennis Galvin 11:26, 20 October 2005 (PDT)

Thinking aloud here: If the fuel capacity of a Transcontinental 767 is 90770 liters or 23980 US gallons (767-200ER spec), I'm not getting a warm fuzzy feeling about the amount of fuel rolling around on surface streets of our major cities. The tanks can hold say 60000 liters (tank mfr). Seems a lot of damage could be done with a suicide style crash into a large occupied downtown building. Trucks are notoriously easier to drive than a plane is to fly, so is it not conceivable a full fuel tanker could be taken over at a highway rest stop and we can have another terrorist act with large repercussions?

--Chris DuPuis 14:47, 20 October 2005 (PDT) Yes, I would agree that fuel trucks are a cause for concern. But a ship would be even more dangerous, given the larger carrying capacity. The 1918 explosion of a ship carrying explosives in Halifax, NS leveled 2 square kilometers of the city.

link

That explosion was caused by approx. 200,000 tons of TNT. A ship carrying refined gasoline or natural gas could be equally dangerous.

--Jeff Davis 19:17, 20 Octobor 2005 (PDT) This is another area where early detection and prevention would be the main defense. This document discusses the implications for the trucking industry. It talks about adding background checks, GPS tracking, driver authentication measures, etc.

What if we could solve the airplane threat and the trucking threat with technology? Commercial airplanes and commercial trucks have one thing in common: their intended destination is known in advance. Why not build them so that the route is pre-programmed by a central tracking station or air traffic control and any deviation from that route must be authorized by someone other than the driver/pilot. Trucks could refuse to start if GPS detects they've strayed to far off their course. Airplanes are more difficult since you can't just land them, but they could refuse to change their course until approved by air traffic control.