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	<title>Comments on: Cold Boot Attacks on Disk Encryption</title>
	<atom:link href="http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/</link>
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	<pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 14:20:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: robertm2</title>
		<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2401</link>
		<dc:creator>robertm2</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 20:39:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2401</guid>
		<description>This seems like a very serious problem especially since one would assume that his/her data would be completely safe as long as the key or the password needed to retrieve the key is compromised, which would seem very unlikely.

Am I missing something though?  I realize that there is currently a problem, but couldn't the OS's implement changes (which seems somewhat trivial) so that it would overwrite the memory location where the key is stored or just the entire memory itself with junk before shutting down or sleeping?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This seems like a very serious problem especially since one would assume that his/her data would be completely safe as long as the key or the password needed to retrieve the key is compromised, which would seem very unlikely.</p>
<p>Am I missing something though?  I realize that there is currently a problem, but couldn&#8217;t the OS&#8217;s implement changes (which seems somewhat trivial) so that it would overwrite the memory location where the key is stored or just the entire memory itself with junk before shutting down or sleeping?</p>
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		<title>By: UW Computer Security Course Blog &#187; Security Review: Full disk encryption</title>
		<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2361</link>
		<dc:creator>UW Computer Security Course Blog &#187; Security Review: Full disk encryption</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 05:24:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2361</guid>
		<description>[...] While this blog has explored both the recent security breach and specific encryption tools (cold-boot attacks , Truecrypt security review), this security review will take a broad look at the security [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] While this blog has explored both the recent security breach and specific encryption tools (cold-boot attacks , Truecrypt security review), this security review will take a broad look at the security [...]</p>
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		<title>By: iddav</title>
		<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2134</link>
		<dc:creator>iddav</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 01:42:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2134</guid>
		<description>Approaches based on specialized cryptography hardware may be even more appealing in light of this discovery. HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) are designed to securely store keys and perform basic encryption functions. In addition to speeding up cryptographic operations, the encryption would be performed in a secured module, so the encryption keys would not need to be stored unencrypted in RAM or the hard drive.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_Security_Module</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Approaches based on specialized cryptography hardware may be even more appealing in light of this discovery. HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) are designed to securely store keys and perform basic encryption functions. In addition to speeding up cryptographic operations, the encryption would be performed in a secured module, so the encryption keys would not need to be stored unencrypted in RAM or the hard drive.</p>
<p><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_Security_Module" rel="nofollow">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_Security_Module</a></p>
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		<title>By: Robert</title>
		<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2121</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 23:29:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2121</guid>
		<description>Hibernation writes the contents of your memory to disk so the computer can power down without losing state.  According to this information, a machine in sleep mode or even a machine that was just recently powered down is also vulnerable since DRAM loses stored memory slowly.

This shows just how important phsyical security of computers really is.  Not all private data is stored on servers locked away in datacenters.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hibernation writes the contents of your memory to disk so the computer can power down without losing state.  According to this information, a machine in sleep mode or even a machine that was just recently powered down is also vulnerable since DRAM loses stored memory slowly.</p>
<p>This shows just how important phsyical security of computers really is.  Not all private data is stored on servers locked away in datacenters.</p>
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		<title>By: Scott Rose</title>
		<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2100</link>
		<dc:creator>Scott Rose</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 17:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2100</guid>
		<description>New York Times coverage of the paper (byline John Markoff) is available at http://tinyurl.com/2kxf6s</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New York Times coverage of the paper (byline John Markoff) is available at <a href="http://tinyurl.com/2kxf6s" rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/2kxf6s</a></p>
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		<title>By: Dan Halperin</title>
		<link>http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2099</link>
		<dc:creator>Dan Halperin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 17:08:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/22/cold-boot-attacks-on-disk-encryption/#comment-2099</guid>
		<description>Well-known security research and commentator and &lt;i&gt;UW Ph.D. Alum&lt;/i&gt; Ed Felton ... :)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well-known security research and commentator and <i>UW Ph.D. Alum</i> Ed Felton &#8230; <img src='http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':)' class='wp-smiley' /></p>
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