Comments on: Security Review: Tor http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/09/security-review-tor/ Wed, 20 Aug 2008 16:53:42 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5.1 By: iddav http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/09/security-review-tor/#comment-480 iddav Sat, 09 Feb 2008 22:56:27 +0000 http://cubist.cs.washington.edu/Security/2008/02/09/security-review-tor/#comment-480 While Tor protects anonymity, Tor does not provide end-to-end confidentiality for the contents of the data. In particular, while the data sent within the Tor network is encrypted, the data sent from a Tor exit node to a destination server is clear-text. In what is called the 2007 "hack of the year," security consultant Dan Egerstad intercepted and publish high-level email logins in many governments and embassies around the world simply by setting up and monitoring a set of Tor exit nodes. It is believed that Dan interrupted some unknown entity's intelligence gathering operation that used Tor to anonymously transfer collected data. Details here: http://www.theage.com.au/news/security/the-hack-of-the-year/2007/11/12/1194766589522.html?page=fullpage One quote I found particularly interesting was the justification for opening Tor to the public: "The problem is, if you make Tor a tool that's only used by the military... by using Tor you're advertising that you're military." Given that Tor is considered useful for 'military' purposes and has been found to transfer data as sensitive as email accounts for inter-governmental communications, does that not make the Tor network a blatant target for intelligence gathering? Would it not make sense for intelligence services to have, like Dan, setup exit nodes to sniff the potentially sensitive data transfered through Tor? Perhaps by using Tor in the first place, users are drawing more attention to the very activities they are trying to protect. While Tor protects anonymity, Tor does not provide end-to-end confidentiality for the contents of the data. In particular, while the data sent within the Tor network is encrypted, the data sent from a Tor exit node to a destination server is clear-text. In what is called the 2007 “hack of the year,” security consultant Dan Egerstad intercepted and publish high-level email logins in many governments and embassies around the world simply by setting up and monitoring a set of Tor exit nodes. It is believed that Dan interrupted some unknown entity’s intelligence gathering operation that used Tor to anonymously transfer collected data. Details here:
http://www.theage.com.au/news/security/the-hack-of-the-year/2007/11/12/1194766589522.html?page=fullpage

One quote I found particularly interesting was the justification for opening Tor to the public: “The problem is, if you make Tor a tool that’s only used by the military… by using Tor you’re advertising that you’re military.” Given that Tor is considered useful for ‘military’ purposes and has been found to transfer data as sensitive as email accounts for inter-governmental communications, does that not make the Tor network a blatant target for intelligence gathering? Would it not make sense for intelligence services to have, like Dan, setup exit nodes to sniff the potentially sensitive data transfered through Tor? Perhaps by using Tor in the first place, users are drawing more attention to the very activities they are trying to protect.

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